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The Law of Admiralty-A Primer
Robert C. Bensing and Harold E. Friedman
THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY opens a new era of commerce
in the midwestern United States. With increased trade and naviga-
tion must be anticipated an increased emphasis upon the law which
deals with the problems inherent in the carriage of goods and pas-
sengers by water, i.e., the law of admiralty.
The legal problems associated with expanded maritime commerce
will involve many segments of the legal profession and will not be
limited to a small group of admiralty lawyers. Yet, while the law
of admiralty has some simi-
larities to the land law, it
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LL-B., 1947, Louisville, LL.M., 1948, Yale, the common-law traditions
J.S.D., 1950, Yale) is Professor of law, West-
ern Reserve University. with which most attorneys
are familiar because of its
HAROLD E. FRIEDMAN (B.Sc., 1956, Ohio connection with a single in-
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of the Western Reserve Law Review. cal development. It is, there-
fore, the objective of this
article to summarize the his-
tory and basic principles of maritime law in order to acquaint the
non-admiralty lawyer with some of the problems in this area.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
To some, a study of admiralty law without allusion to its histori-
cal antecedents would be as deficient as a treatise on equity without
consideration of the role of the chancellor. Although a familiarity
with the ancient sea codes would add polish to the admiralty lawyer's
performance, this knowledge is no longer a pre-requisite to an under-
standing of the present law. However, in order to appreciate the
development of admiralty law, a brief historical survey is necessary.
The origin of water transportation may be traced to early times
in recorded history.' The Mediterranean became the cradle of mari-
time development as the Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Greeks estab-
lished vast commercial empires. During this period, 3000 years be-
fore Christ, there developed a body of customs which became the
foundation of an international sea law.
From its inception maritime law was independent of the will of
sovereign states, but dependent upon the customs and experiences of
1. -The earliest picture of a boat, found on an Egyptian vase, has been dated at some 6000
years B.C." WIGMORE, PANtoAMA OF THE WoaLD's LEGAL SysrEMs 875 (1936).
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the merchants and mariners. As maritime courts developed along-
side "land" courts, rules emerged which were then codified in the
leading commercial centers. The pre-eminence of the commercial
centers with their independent merchant courts subsided as great na-
tion-states arose. The international law of the sea was absorbed by
authoritative codifications.2
In England, the jurisdiction of the local maritime courts, which
sat in port towns, was annexed to the office of the Lord High Ad-
miral, and, by 1391, Parliament defined that jurisdiction as "a thing
done upon the sea." '3 As the admiral's court increased in stature, it
aroused the jealousy of the common-law courts. The latter, literally
interpreting the admiral's jurisdictional grant, issued writs of prohi-
bition which kept "admiralty" matters within extremely narrow lim-
its. Despite this action, the common-law courts were unable to com-
pletely exterminate the admiralty, and, having survived, admiralty
jurisdiction was vastly enlarged by nineteenth century parliaments.4
Courts of general maritime jurisdiction were established in the
English colonies unhampered by the common-law writs. Thus, the
tradition of a specialized court to handle a wide scope of maritime
problems became fixed in America. Today, since the federal con-
stitution places admiralty jurisdiction within the federal judicial sys-
tem, it is necessary to bring actions on the admiralty side of federal
court in order to have the benefit of the unique aspects of admiralty
law, which aspects will be considered later.
It had long been thought that the rise of nationalism would spell
doom for a common law of the sea; to a limited extent it did. How-
ever, technology has now made the world smaller, and the develop-
ment of international trade has been enormous. Thus, the need for
uniformity and consistency, so vital to commerce, has overridden sov-
ereign supremacy in certain areas. Standard navigation rules (rules
of the road) have been adopted by all shipping nations. Internation-
al committees have also played a dominant role in influencing uni-
form legislation in the various nations. Once more, the trend is to-
ward a common law of the sea.5
JURISDICTION
Admiralty jurisdiction in the United States today is the product
of the Constitution, the Congress, and the Supreme Court. Under
the Constitution, judicial power in "all cases of admiralty and mar-
2. The most influential of the incorporations of established customs of the sea into the laws
of a sovereign nation was the Ordinance de la Marine of France, promulgated under Louis XIV
in 1681.
3. 13 Rich. II c. 5 (1389) and 15 Rich. II c. 3 (1391).
4. 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65 (1840); 13 & 14 Vict. c. 26 (1850); 24 Vict. c. 10 (1861).
5. See GILMORE AND BLACK, ADMIRALTY 782 (1957).
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time jurisdiction" is given to the federal courts.6  In the Judiciary
Act of 1789, by which Congress established the inferior federal
courts and defined their jurisdiction, "exclusive original cognizance
of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" was placed
in the federal district courts, "saving to suitors, in all cases," how-
ever, "the right of a common law remedy, where the common law
is competent to give it."'7
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
While the "saving clause" presents problems for future discus-
sion, at this point it is sufficient merely to observe that it in no way
deprives the federal courts of the right to hear and determine with
binding results any maritime cases presented to them. Thus, from
the very beginning, the federal courts sitting as courts of admiralty,
and not as common-law courts, assumed jurisdiction over maritime
causes of action." This jurisdiction is general; there is no require-
ment of diversity of citizenship or of a minimum amount in contro-
versy, as there is in federal civil cases.9 If a non-maritime action is
involved, admiralty has no jurisdiction over the case. The suitor
wrongfully filing his petition in admiralty must begin again, either in
a state court or on the civil side of the federal district court, provid-
ing the jurisdictional requisites exist.' 0
Jurisdiction Over Substantive Law of Admiralty
The constitutional grant has been interpreted as giving to the fed-
eral government judicial and legislative supremacy over the sub-
stantive law of admiralty. It is recognized that it is for the federal
government, by judicial decision or by legislation, to determine what
causes are admiralty and maritime and what are not, and to formu-
late the rules of law to be applied to such causes." While federal
legislation has played an important part in the shaping of this law,
most of it is the result of judicial decision.
In developing the content of admiralty, the Supreme Court se-
lected what it considered suitable from the maritime law of the inter-
national community of seafaring nations and refused to adopt the
law of England or of any other single country. 2 Where problems
peculiar to the United States arose, the Court either altered an estab-
6. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2.
7. 1 Stat. 76 (1789). For the present section see 28 U.S.C. S 1333 (1952).
8. A separate docket is maintained in the district courts for admiralty cases.
9. 1 BENEDiCr, ADm.'nALTY § 2 (6th ed. 1940).
10. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 30 (1957).
11. See Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Detroit Trust Co. v. Steamer Thomas
Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1924); Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
12. Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late Years, 37 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1924).
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lished maritime rule to fit the particular need or devised a new one.
By the start of the twentieth century the basic rules of American ad-
miralty had been developed. Consequently, references to foreign
rules became less frequent and in the last few years have all but dis-
appeared. 3
Extent of Jurisdiction
Waters
That the federal courts' domain over "all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction"' 4 extends to the seven seas has never been ques-
tioned. As to lesser waters, however, there has been considerable
doubt. Early American courts did not confine themselves within the
limitations imposed upon the jurisdiction of English admiralty
courts,' 5 but adopted instead a "tide-water" test to determine the ex-
tent of the waters covered.' 6 With the advent of the steamboat, jur-
isdiction was extended to include all waters which are in fact navi-
gable in interstate or foreign commerce,'17 and it is "navigable water"
which is the touchstone of admiralty jurisdiction in America today.
Thus, it has been clear for many years, even in the absence of con-
gressional authority, that navigable rivers and the Great Lakes fall
within federal maritime jurisdiction.' 8
Furthermore, the jurisdictional element is the "water" itself; if it
is a highway for interstate or foreign commerce, it makes no differ-
ence that the vessel is not engaged in such commerce. 19 Whether a
particular water has navigable capacity is a question of fact of which
the courts take judicial notice,20 although should the point be in
doubt, evidence may be introduced and considered."
13. GILMORE & BLACK, ADIMmALTY 41 (1957).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. For a discussion of the English tradition, which in effect excluded maritime jurisdiction
from all but the high seas, see 7 WEST. REs. L. REV. 72 (1956).
16. In De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass., 1815), Justice Story
held that the Federal courts were not bound by the artificial restraints which had been placed
on the English maritime courts.
17. The first breach in the "tidewater" test occurred in Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
441 (1847), where the Supreme Court held a point 95 miles above New Orleans, on the Mis-
sissippi, to be within the tide. The Supreme Court, however, completely rejected the "tide-
water" test in the Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), and promul-
gated the "navigable water" test in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
18. In 1845, Congress passed a statute extending Federal maritime jurisdiction to the Great
Lakes. 5 Stat. 726. The Supreme Court, however, through the Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); Fretz v. J. C. Bull & Co., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466 (1851)
(involving a collision on the Mississippi, not covered by the statute); Jackson v. The Magnolia,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857); and other cases made it dear that the jurisdiction extended
to bodies of navigable water as such, and not merely because Congress said so. Ultimately
the act was recognized as superfluous.
19. Ex Parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
20. Montello, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 41 (1870).
21. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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Fessels
The juridical personification of a "vessel," granting to it rights
and liabilities distinct from those of its owners, is a distinguishing
factor of maritime law. For this reason, in addition to the fact that
admiralty courts generally exercise jurisdiction only where vessels,
their cargoes, or personnel are involved, it is necessary to know just
what is a "vessel."
In the vast majority of cases, the conclusion that a vessel is or is
not involved is obvious. Federal statutes define the word "vessel"
as including "every description of water-craft or other artificial con-
trivance used or capable of being used as a means of transportation
on water.12 2  There is, however, a marginal area wherein hair-split-
ting distinctions are drawn.
A ferryboat,3 a barge,24 a raft of timber,25 and a hydroplane
while on the water26 have been considered vessels within admiralty
jurisdiction; while a floating derrick anchored near a seawall,27 a
sailor's floating meeting house,28 and a ferry bridge chained to a
wharf29 have not. Although size of the craft is not the key to the
determination, its purpose may very well be.30
Likewise, the point at which a vessel becomes a vessel is impor-
tant. It is generally held that for tort purposes a vessel is born when
launched ;31 whereas for contract purposes it does not become one un-
til all of the construction work is completed, both ashore and afloat.3 2
Contracts
From the foregoing, it is seen that admiralty jurisdiction is re-
lated to "vessels" and "navigable waters." Thus, suits in tort for
collision, for damage to cargo, and for injuries to seamen and pas-
sengers, if occurring upon such vessels and waters, are clearly within
the admiralty domain.
However, to establish jurisdiction over suits based on contracts,
it is necessary that the nature and character of the transaction be in
substance maritime. If the agreement relates to the "navigation,
business, or commerce of the sea," the contract is maritime. And
22. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1928).
23. United States v. Burlington & Henderson County Ferry Co., 21 Fed. 331 (S.D. Ia. 1884).
24. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
25. Muntz v. A Raft of Timber, 15 Fed. 555 (E.D. La. 1883).
26. Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921).
27. Heikkila v. S. Rich Steers, Inc., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 578 (N.Y. App. Div.).
28. Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887).
29. Ibid.
30. 1 BENEDiCr, ADMIRALTY 109-12 (6th ed. 1940).
31. Taylor v. United States Casualty Co., 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 639 (1933).
32. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1901).
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it is no less maritime because it is to be performed on land, for unlike
admiralty jurisdiction in tort, subject matter, and not locality, is the
criterion for contract jurisdiction.3 3  Contracts for the chartering of
ships,3 4 for repairs and supplies furnished to vessels, 5 for carriage
of goods36 and passengers,3 7 for towage,38 pilotage,39 and wharfage41
are all of such a nature.
A policy of maritime insurance is within admiralty jurisdiction,
but an agreement to make such a contract has been held not to be.41
Other areas which might be thought to be within admiralty, but which
are not, include contracts for the building 42 and sale of vessels,43 and
for services to a vessel laid up and out of navigation.44
Although there are hazy areas, such as quasi-contract claims aris-
ing out of maritime transactions and mixed contracts, 45 for practical
purposes the outlines of contract jurisdiction are well-enough defined.
In Rem v. In Personam Proceedings
Admiralty proceedings may be divided into two categories: pro-
ceedings in personam and proceedings in rem. An admiralty suit in
personam corresponds to an ordinary suit in a common-law court:
The suit is against a named individual or corporate defendant; a per-
sonal judgment is rendered against the defendant if he loses; and
execution issues against his property, generally without regard to its
relation to the matter in issue.4" A suit in rem, however, is a pro-
ceeding against the thing itself, which is treated as being responsible
for the claim asserted by the libellant (plaintiff). The property is
33. It is interesting to note the English view, which conceded admiralty jurisdiction only to
contracts made and to be performed upon navigable water. 1 BENEDIcT, ADMIRALTY 127
(6th ed. 1940).
34. Morewood v. Enequist, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 491 (1860).
35. North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 249 U.S. 119 (1919);
The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819).
36. Brittan v. Barnaby, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 527 (1859); New Jersey Steam Navigation Co.
v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848).
37. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
38. The Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
39. Ex Parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 242-43 (1871).
40. Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68 (1877).
41. For a discussion of this aspect of maritime v. non-maritime agreements, see 1 BENEDICT,
ADMIRALTY 127 (6th ed. 1940).
42. See note 38, supra. The problem in this area is that of distinguishing the building of a
vessel from the repairing of one.
43. The Ada, 250 Fed. 194 (2d Cit. 1918); Grand Banks Fishing Co. v. Styron, 114 F.
Supp. 1, (D. Me. 1953).
44. Murray v. Schwartz, 175 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1949); The Andrew J. Smith, 263 Fed. 1004
(E.D.N.Y. 1920).
45. Mixed contracts are those, part of which would be, if standing alone, within the juris-
diction, and part without. GILMORE & BLAcK, ADuIRALTY 26 (1957).
46. 2 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 226 (6th ed. 1940); see ADMIRALTY R. 2.
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the defendant and is proceeded against by name.47 Thus, the style
of the libel (petition) : The Libel of C. DeWitt v. The Propellor
Carib Prince, or against 4,855 Bags of Linseed. After the libel in
rem is filed, the property is taken into custody by the federal mar-
shal, who then gives notice (usually by newspaper publication) to
the world at large of the fact of seizure upon libel, and of the time
and place for the return of process and the hearing of the cause. 48
Notice need not be served on the owner of the property.
If the owner does not intervene and defend the action, the prop-
erty is sold, and the proceeds are used to satisfy the judgment. Since
the power and process of the court are against the thing itself, the
judgment binds only the property seized. If the proceeds are insuf-
ficient to satisfy the claim, no personal judgment can be had against
the owner for the deficiency. 49 However, so far as the property it-
self is concerned, a sale under a proceeding in rem transfers not mere-
ly the title or interest of the owner, but a clear and indefeasible title
good against the whole world. 50
When the owner appears and defends a suit in rem, he is called
a "claimant." If he wants possession of his property he may - and
usually does where a ship is involved - "bond" the claim, in which
event the property is released, and the bond becomes for the purpose
of the suit a substitute for the property libelled. 1
In most instances, in rem and in personam actions may be joined
in one suit. 52 The Supreme Court has not yet determined whether
the owner of the property submits himself to the court's jurisdiction,
so as to permit a personal judgment against him for any deficit, by
appearing to protect his interest in an action in which the libellant has
sued only in rem, but could also have sued in personam. Lower courts
have generally refused to grant personal judgments against the own-
ers in these instances. 3 In several recent cases, however, judgments
have been granted in amounts greater than the bonds posted for the
release of the property. 4
47. See Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886).
48. ADMIRYR. 10.
49. 2 BBNEDICr, ADMIRALTY 5 226 (6th ed. 1940).
50. The Trenton, 4 Fed. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1880); GILMORE & BLACK, ADmntALTY 33
(1957).
51. Ibid. For the methods of bonding the property, see 62 Star. 974 (1948), 28 U.S.C. S
2464 (1952), and ADMMALTY R. 12. See also GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 649
(1957).
52. See ADMmALTY P. 13-19. All suits for assaults are maintainable only in personam.
ADMIRALTY R. 15. All suits on bottomry bonds are maintainable only in rem, except where
a personal fraud is involved. ADMMALTY R. 17. See also 2 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 228
(6th ed. 1940).
53. See Logue Stevedoring Corp. v. The Dalzellance, 198 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1952), and cases
cited therein.
54. Mosher v. Tate, 182 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1950); The Fair Isle, 76 F. Supp. 27 (D. Md.
1947), affd sub -nom. Watermann S.S. Corp. v. Dean, 171 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1948). Also
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Maritime Liens
In order to succeed in a suit in rem, it is necessary that the libel-
lant establish the existence of a maritime lien. "The only object of
the proceeding in rem, is to make this right [the lien], where it ex-
ists, available... [and] to carry it into effect. It subserves no other
purpose. The lien and the proceedings in rem are, therefore, cor-
relative .... Where one exists, the other can be taken, and not other-
wise.
''55
Maritime liens arise only out of claims that are themselves mari-
time. Thus, it is necessary in the first instance to determine what is
within admiralty jurisdiction: "what types of structures qualify as
'vessels'; which contracts are maritime contracts; when a tort is a
maritime tort."5" Although most maritime claims give rise to liens,
no formula exists, in the absence of a statute, for determining
whether a lien attaches to a particular claim. 57  Among the many
claims which have been given lien status are: seamen's claims for
wages ;58 salvage claims ;59 tort claims, including both collision and
personal injury claims ;60 preferred ship mortgages;61 contract claims
for repairs, supplies, towage, wharfage, and other necessaries fur-
nished to a vessel;2 and the claim of the ship against the cargo for
unpaid freight and demurrage. 3
Maritime liens are of two types. The first is possessory and is
lost by unconditional delivery.64 Such is the lien of the ship against
the cargo for unpaid freight and demurrage, or for damage done to
a vessel by its cargo."5 With respect to their dependency upon pos-
see The Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509 (2d Cir. 1906). For an excellent discussion of these cases
and of the entire problem, see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMELALTY 652-54 (1957).
55. The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. 213 (1867).
56. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 512 (1957). See discussion under WATERS and
VESSELS, supra.
57. Ibid.
58. A master, however, has no lien for wages due. Walker v. Woolsey, 186 F.2d 920 (5th
Cir. 1951).
59. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879).
60. Seamen's actions for personal injury brought under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952), and suits for an assault or beating on the high seas or elsewhere
within admiralty jurisdiction (see ADMIRALTY R. 15) can only be brought in personam.
They are the only maritime tort claims which do not give rise to liens. See GILMORE & BLACK,
ADMIRALTY 514 (1957).
61. See 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1952), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 951 (Supp.
V, 1958).
62. Most liens in this category are covered by the Maritime Lien Act, 41 Stat. 1005, 1006
(1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 971-75 (1952). No lien arises from the breach of an executory con-
tract. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 5 9-22 (1957).
63. Jebsen v. A Cargo of Hemp, 228 Fed. 143 (D. Mass. 1915).
64. Easter Transp. Co. v. United States, 159 F.2d 349 (2d Cit. 1947).
65. See HUGHES, ADMIRALTY 95 (2d ed. 1920); GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 516
(1957).
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session, these liens are similar to common-law liens and involve noth-
ing new to the land lawyer.
The second type of maritime lien, however, is so radically differ-
ent that it ". . . is not a lien at all in the common-law sense of the
term." '66 Its most important characteristic is that it is independent of
possession of the property against which it exists - independent not
only in that the lienor does not have to retain possession of the prop-
erty, but in that he has no right to its possession.67 Further, its ex-
istence is not dependent upon the personal liability of the owner of
the property, for, as will be remembered, in American admiralty jur-
isprudence the thing itself is considered a legal entity.6"
The maritime lien is often a truly secret one, for, with the excep-
tion of the preferred ship mortgage,6" it does not have to be recorded.
Once the lien attaches, unless the owner of the property satisfies it
by payment, it can be discharged only by an admiralty court proceed-
ing in rem."0  It prevails even over a bona fide purchaser, and no
common-law court, federal or state, can abrogate it.7 1 It is not com-
pletely indelible, however, for it may be lost by laches.72
A sale under a decree in rem frees the property sold of all liens,
including those of lienors who neither intervened nor had knowledge
of the suit, and, as previously stated, the sale transfers a clear and
indefeasible title to the purchaser.7 3 Furthermore, the decree "is
given international recognition."7 4 Thus, an Englishman who has re-
paired an American ship, and holds a lien thereon, may discover that
his lien has been discharged by an American admiralty court in a suit
in rem of which he had no knowledge. However, if the shipowner
is personally obligated to the English supplier the obligation is not
discharged by the decree in rem, which acts only upon the thing itself.
After sale of property under a decree in rem, whatever liens ex-
isted are transferred to the proceeds of the sale. The court then dis-
tributes the proceeds among the original libellant and the interve-
nors75 according to the priorities of their claims.7 6  Except for ex-
66. GrtMORE & BLACK, ADMmIALTY 480 (1957).
67. HUGHEs, ADMIRALTY 95 (2d ed. 1920). The lienor may, of course, have the property
arrested on process issuing from the admiralty court pursuant to the commencement of a suit
in rem.
68. The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868).
69. See 49 Star. 2016 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 911 (1952); 41 Star. 1000 (1920),
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1952); 49 Stat. 424 (1935), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 922
(1952).
70. Gn .o & BLAcK, ADMiRALTY 482 (1957).
71. ROBINSON, ADMRALTY 363 (1939).
72. SeeThe Key City, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 653 (1871).
73. The Trenton, 4 Fed. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1880).
74. GILMORE & BLAK, ADmmIA.TY 482, 641 (1957).
75. On the matter of intervention, see ADM.RALTY R. 34 and 42. Also see 2 BENEDIcr,
ADMAxTY §§ 346-48 (6th ed. 1940); HUGHEs, ADMmIATY 397 (2d ed. 1920).
76. Upon sale pursuant to a proceeding in rem of a vessel covered by a preferred ship mort-
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penses connected with operating and maintaining a vessel when it is
in legal custody, 77 and possibly federal and state tax claims, 78 mari-
time lien claims are superior to all other claims.79 However, once
maritime lien claims have been satisfied any surplus will be distributed
to non-maritime, or common-law, lien claimants, such as common-law
mortgagees.80 Whether maritime but non-lien claimants may share
at all in the surplus held by the admiralty court is a matter upon
which the cases are so inconclusive that it must be regarded as an
open question."' However, non-maritime non-lien claimants, with
one exception,82 have not been permitted to share in the surplus 3
More difficult questions arise as to the priority of maritime liens
among themselves. Considerations of time and space, however, per-
mit the making of only the broadest generalizations.8 4  Thus quali-
fied, maritime lien claims rank by class in the following order of
priority :85
(1) Liens of seamen based upon claims for wages.
(2) Salvage liens.
(3) Tort liens based upon collision, and personal injury
claims.
(4) Contract liens for repairs, supplies, towage, wharfage,
and other necessaries.
gage, the vessel is sold free of all pre-existing claims, including such mortgage, but upon the
request of the mortgagee, the libellant, or any intervenor, the court ". . . shall ... require the
purchaser at such sale to give and the mortgagor to accept a new mortgage of the vessel for the
balance of the term of the original mortgage." The terms of the new mortgage shall be the
same as those of the original, so far as is practicable. "If such new mortgage is given, the
mortgagee shall not be paid from the proceeds of the sale, and the amount payable as the pur-
chase price shall be held diminished in the amount of the new mortgage indebtedness." 49
Stat. 1987 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 961 (1952).
77. See New York Dock Co. v. Steamship Poznan, 274 U.S. 117 (1927).
78. The Supreme Court has not litigated this question, and the few lower court decisions are
in conflict. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 9-73 to -90 (1957).
79. See The Guiding Star, 18 Fed. 263 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1883). Also see Beach, Relative
Priority of Maritime Liens, 33 YALE L.J. 841 (1924).
80. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874); The Trenton, 4 Fed. 657 (E.D.
Mich. 1880).
81. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 641 (1957). For an excellent analysis of the cases,
see id. at §§ 9-87, -88.
82. In The Duchess, 201 Fed. 783 (E.D.N.Y. 1912), seller of vessel was allowed to collect
amount due upon certain notes from surplus after sale of vessel which had been libelled in
hands of buyer and sold.
83. The surplus is turned over to the owner, or to his trustee if he is bankrupt. See the two
appeals in The Lottawanna, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 201 (1873), and 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558
(1874). Also see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 644-47 (1957).
84. On this matter of priorities, Professors Black and Gilmore state: "General statements of
doctrine. .. should be on the whole lightly regarded. Nine times out of ten, what seems fair
to the trial judge will be the law of the case for all time." GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY
594 (1957).
85. See The William Leishear, 21 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1927). Also see Willard, Priorities
Among Maritime Liens, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 522 (1931).
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(5) Bottomry and respondentia liens.86
It is an admiralty maxim that liens of the same class rank in in-
verse order to the order of their creation."t That is, the last is first
and the first is last. In practice, this proposition has always been
subject to various limitations. Historically, liens of the same class
accruing on the last voyage were superior to those of a prior voy-
age."" At present, the "voyage" rule has for the most part been
superseded"9 by rules based upon periods of time such as the 40-day
New York harbor rule, 90 the 90-day Puget Sound area rule,91 the
"season)) rule applied to Great Lakes shipping,92 and the "year" or
"calendar year" rule applied in areas where navigation continues un-
interrupted throughout the year.9 3 For example, under the Great
Lakes "season" rule, suppose A furnished fuel oil to the vessel City
of Cleveland in March of 1958, and B furnished fuel oil to the same
ship in September of 1958. Coming within the same shipping sea-
son, these liens would rank equally. They would outrank, however,
a fuel oil lien, or any other lien of the same class, which accrued dur-
ing a prior shipping season.
The matter of pribrity is also affected by the Ship Mortgage Act
of 1920."4 Under the act, a so-called "preferred" mortgage has pri-
ority over subsequent liens, with the exception of liens based upon the
following: damages arising out of tort, wages of a stevedore when
employed by the vessel, wages of the crew, general average, or sal-
vage.9"
86. "This [bottomry) is an obligation executed generally in a foreign port by the master of a
vessel for repayment of advances to supply the necessities of the ship, together with such in-
terest as may be agreed upon, which bond creates a lien on the ship enforceable in admiralty
in case of her safe arrival at the port of destination, but becoming absolutely void.., in case
of her loss before arrival." HUGHES, ADMmtALTY 94 (2d ed. 1920). Respondentia is a
hypothecation of cargo similar to the hypothecation of the vessel by bottomry. Id. at 97.
Bottomry and respondentia bonds are almost never used today.
87. See The St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409 (1824); The America, 168 Fed.
424 (N.DJ. 1909).
88. See the Proceeds of the Gratitude, 42 Fed. 299 (D.N.Y. 1890); The Fanny, 8 Fed.
Cas. 993 (No. 4,638) (D. Mass. 1876). See ROBINSON, ADMRALTY § 61 (1939).
89. But see Todd Shipyard Corp. v. The City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949).
90. See The Interstate No. I, 290 Fed. 926 (2d Cir. 1923); The Proceeds of the Grati-
tude, 42 Fed. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
91. See The Edith, 217 Fed. 300 (W.D. Wash. 1914).
92. See The City of Tawas, 3 Fed. 170 (E.D. Mich. 1880). On the Great Lakes, the shipping
season, due to ice, consists of approximately eight months.
93. Norton v. The Evan N., 109 F. Supp. 505 (D.R.I. 1952) ("calendar year" rule).
Also see Todd Shipyard Corp. v. The City of Athens, 83 F. Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1949) (court
said "year" rule contemplated priority on basis of calendar year, not on basis of twelve-month
period preceding filing of the initiating libel). The Fort Gaines, 24 F.2d 438 (D. Md.
1928) ("year" rule).
94. Ship Mortgage Act, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84 (1952).
For the status of mortgages on foreign vessels, see 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 951
(1952), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 951 (Supp. V, 1958).
95. See 41 Star. 1004 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1952).
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Saving Clause
As set forth earlier, Congress, through the Judiciary Act of
1789,"6 granted "exclusive" jurisdiction in all civil admiralty cases to
the federal district courts, yet saved "to suitors, in all cases, the right
of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it."' 97  This "saving clause" has been uniformly interpreted as
giving to the state courts, and to the federal courts on the common-
law side if federal requirements are fulfilled,9 8 jurisdiction in per-
sonam over maritime causes of action concurrent with the federal ad-
miralty courts.99
The saving clause, however, does not contemplate the adminis-
tration of admiralty remedies in common-law courts; these remedies
are the exclusive prerogative of the federal courts sitting in admir-
alty. 00 The effect of the Judiciary Act, therefore, is to deny to com-
mon-law courts that remedy which subjects the property itself to the
suitor's claim - the action in rem.10 1 In 1867 in The Moses Tay-
lor,10 2 the first Supreme Court decision on this issue, it was stated
that "a proceeding in rem, as used in the admiralty court is not a
remedy afforded by the common-law; it is a proceeding under the
civil law."
In Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey,103 the Supreme Court drew
this distinction between proceedings which invade the exclusive juris-
diction of admiralty and those which do not:
If the cause of action 'be one cognizable in admiralty, and the suit
be in rem against the thing itself, though a monition be also issued to
the owner, the proceeding is essentially one in admiralty. If, upon the
96. Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Star. 76. For the present provision see 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952).
97. Ibid.
98. The minimum amount required to be in controversy is $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. V, 1958). Except where a federal statute provides
otherwise, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, a suitor may not sue on the common-law
side in federal court on the ground that a maritime claim is one that "arises under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States." See Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp.
V, 1958) : "(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
99. Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Knapp, Stout &
Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185 (1871);
Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857).
100. To the generalization that a judgment in rem is not a common-law remedy, there is an
exception. Forfeiture of the offending object by a procedure in rem, because it has been used
in violation of law, was a practice familiar in the common-law courts of England, the Colonies,
and the states during the period of Confederation. C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133
(1943) (forfeiture of fish net; use of in rem proceeding upheld).
101. 1 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY § 23 (6th ed. 1940).
102. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
103. 177 U.S. 638 (1900).
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other hand, the cause of action be not one of which a court of admiralty
has jurisdiction, or if the suit be in personam against an individual de-
fendant, with an auxiliary attachment against a particular thing, or
against the property of the defendant in general, it is essentially a pro-
ceeding according to the course of the common law, and within the
saving clause of the Statute... of a common law remedy.10 4
Once it is determined that the action is in personam, it seems that
"common law remedy" is to be broadly construed to include:
... remedies in pais, as well as proceedings in court; judicial remedies
conferred by statute, as well as those existing at common law; remedies
in equity, as well as those enforceable in a court of common law.10 5
Thus, in the absence of a federal statute to the contrary, where
the action is in personam, it appears that suit on a maritime right may
be brought in admiralty or in a common-law court, state or federal.
However, where the claim is based on a maritime case and the pro-
ceeding is in rem, only the federal admiralty court has jurisdiction. 10 6
In 1949, Congress changed the language of the saving clause 10 7
apparently in an attempt to simplify it, to make it more expressive of
its intent, and to bring it in conformity with Rule 2 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure abolishing the distinction between law and
equity. 08
The words "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to
which they are otherwise entitled," were substituted for "saving to
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it." It is believed, however, that
the new language will be interpreted the same as the old.10
104. Id. at 648.
105. Red Cross line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 124 (1924) (specific enforcement
by state court of agreement to arbitrate upheld). An equitable action to enforce a common-
law possessory lien by a state court was involved in Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177
U.S. 638 (1900). Workmen's compensation, however, was held not a common-law remedy
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
Admiralty, on the other hand, is said to lack the powers of a court of equity in the absence
of specific federal statute. It has denied itself the right to issue injunctions, grant specific
performance of contracts, or, in most instances, to order the reformation of instruments. GIL-
MORE & BLACK, ADM IRTY 37-39 (1957).
106. ROBINSoN, ADMIRALTY 5 4 (1939). By federal statute, however, the suitor may be
limited as to the forum for his action. See Death on the High Seas By Wrongful Act, 41
Star. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952) (suit must be brought in admiralty). Also see
the Ship Mortgage Act, 41 Stat. 1003 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1952), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ 951 (Supp. V, 1958) (mortgage cannot be foreclosed in a state court), and comments
thereon in GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTr 659 (1957).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952).
108. These are the reasons given in the Reviser's Note to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1949).
109. This view appears to have been accepted in Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556
(1954), and in Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cit. 1950). See comment in GILMORE
& BLACK, ADMIRALTY 35 (1957). Also see Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Sug-
gestions, 50 COL.m. L. REv. 259 (1950).
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Maritime Law Applied in Land Courts
While the saving clause gives the suitor the right to choose a land
court for the trial of his case, this does not mean that shore law will
be applied. Rather, land courts, state or federal, must apply the
same substantive rules that would have been applied had the suit been
brought in admiralty. 1 °
COLLISION
Collision between ships is a relatively common occurrence - far
more so than most would imagine. Although the development of
radar may ultimately reduce the accident toll resulting from the per-
ils of night traffic, fog, and other adverse weather conditions, as yet
the use of such electronic devices has not been so perfected nor so
widely adopted as to eliminate collision cases from the dockets.
Basis of Liability - Fault
Collision liability is predicated upon "fault.""' As a corollary,
it follows that where an accident is "inevitable," there can be no fault
and therefore no liability. "Inevitable" accidents obviously encom-
pass, but are not limited to, those which are a result of an Act of
God. A typical example arises where one vessel in a storm is driven
against another. The test applied is whether the collision could have
been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and mari-
time skill. On the other hand, if fault was present, but the court is
unable to locate it, so that it cannot be said which vessel is to blame,
there is a case of what is known as "inscrutable" fault. In such in-
stance there likewise can be no recovery." 2
"Fault" connotes falling below an accepted standard. Where col-
lision is concerned, the standard may be that of the reasonably pru-
dent navigator, the statutory Rules of Navigation, or occasionally,
the established custom or usage of navigation." 3
Historically, navigation was governed by a common law of the
sea. Today, however, most collision cases arise out of a violation of
one of the statutory Rules of Navigation - commonly called the
"Rules of the Road." These rules are as necessary to navigators of
vessels on the high seas as the rules governing the operation of motor
vehicles are to drivers on shore. They prescribe, for example, the
proper use of lights, how approaching ships are to maneuver in order
to avoid contact, and the signals of communication to be used when
110. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,
247 U.S. 372 (1918).
111. The Java, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 189 (1872).
112. The Jumna, 149 Fed. 171 (2d Cir. 1906); The Worthington & Davis, 19 Fed. 836
(E.D. Mich. 1883).
113. GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF COLLISION (1949).
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navigating at night or in fog. In the United States, maritime traffic
is regulated by four such sets of rules. The International Rules" 4
govern navigation on the high seas. The Great Lakes Rules,'" the
Western Rivers Rules' 6 (applicable to the Mississippi and its tribu-
taries), and the Inland Rules 17 (applicable to all other navigable
waters) govern navigation on inland waterways.
In Extremis
Compliance with the Rules of the Road and standards of prudent
navigation are considered so essential that any deviation resulting in
a collision may be construed as fault per se. In mitigation of this
harsh rule there developed the doctrine of in extremis. Under this
doctrine, if a vessel, through no fault of her own, is placed in a posi-
tion where collision is imminent, an error such as a violation of a Rule
of the Road or failure to meet the standards of prudent navigation
is excused."" The application of in extremis, however, is, of neces-
sity, as vague as the analogous common-law concept of "emer-
gency. '"" 9
Divided Damages Rule
If a collision occurs and neither vessel is at fault each must pay its
own loss. 20 On the other hand, if only one vessel is at fault, it must
bear its loss and pay the other's damage as well.' 2 ' In situations
where both vessels are at fault, there developed in admiralty a doc-
trine peculiar by common-law standards. Whereas under the com-
mon law neither vessel could recover, in admiralty the damages are
divided equally in such instances, so that each bears half of the total
damage. 22 Thus, the less damaged vessel is required to pay the dif-
ference to the vessel which is more damaged.
If, however, an action is brought in a common-law court under
the saving clause and both vessels are at fault, and if the court ap-
plies the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence instead of
the admiralty divided damages rule, neither vessel can recover from
the other. 23 Common-law courts would appear free to adopt the
114. 6A BENEDICT, ADIRmALTY 827-42 (7th ed. 1958).
115. 6 BENDIcr, ADMIRAmJTY 430-36 (6th ed. 1941).
116. 6 BENEDIcT, op. cit. supra note 115, at 449-54.
117. GRIFFIN, op. cit. supra note 113, at 645-84.
118. The Stifinder, 275 Fed. 271 (2d Cir. 1921).
119. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632, 640 (4th Cir. 1949).
120. The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880); The Lepanto, 21 Fed. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1884).
121. The Clara, 102 U.S. 200 (1880); Oaksmith v. Garner, 205 F.2d 262 (9th Cit. 1953);
The Mayflower, 94 F. Supp. 574 (D. Alaska 1951).
122. The Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
123. Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893). Although the question of whether the divided
damage rule or the doctrine of contributory negligence is to be used appears to be a matter of
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divided damages rule if they wish, and at least one state 24 and a fed-
eral court of appeals 125 have done so.
Major-Minor Fault
Some jurisdictions, such as England, have adopted a division of
damages based upon comparative fault. If one vessel is 80 per cent
at fault and the other is only 20 per cent at fault, the former must
bear 80 per cent of the loss and the latter only 20 per cent.
Under American law, there is no consideration of comparative
fault. This would result in extreme inequities if it were not for the
"major-minor" fault rule. Under this rule, where one vessel is gross-
ly negligent and the other is at fault in a technical sense only, the
court may close its eyes to the conduct of the latter. In application,
however, the "major-minor" fault rule varies from case to case, and
in many instances is ignored, even though the fault of one vessel ap-
pears out of proportion to that of another.
126
Causation - The Pennsylvania Rule
In admiralty, as at common law, there must be a causal connec-
tion between fault and the resulting injury. However, unlike the
common law, admiralty does not operate on an all-or-nothing philos-
ophy. Whereas contributory negligence will bar a common-law negli-
gence suit, the equivalent set of facts in admiralty may well result
in divided damages. In order for the divided damages rule to come
into play, both vessels must be at fault. Thus, the admiralty courts
give special attention to the question of causation. It is from this
situation that the "Pennsylvania" rule l evolved.
Under the "Pennsylvania" rule, once it is shown that a vessel was
guilty of statutory fault, as, for example, failure to comply with the
Rules of Navigation, a presumption arises that the guilty vessel
"caused" the injury. Once the presumption arises, the vessel charged
with fault has the onerous burden of proving that it could not have
been a cause of the collision. In practice, however, if the other ves-
sel has been grossly at fault, this burden is generally surmountable.
substance rather than procedure, the Belden case held otherwise. There is reason to believe
that the Supreme Court will overturn the Belden v. Chase doctrine and require the common-law
courts to apply the admiralty divided damages rule. See Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406 (1953). Also see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 7-6 (1957).
124. Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 26 Cal.2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1946).
125. Cf. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 198 F.2d 376 (2d Cit. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 896 (1952). The case did not involve collision, but the court's language is
comprehensive enough to include collision cases.
126. Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F. 2d 264 (3d Cit. 1953).
127. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874).
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SALVAGE
No segment of maritime law evokes more excitement and brings
to mind more adventure and romance than the subject of salvage.
"Salvage is a reward for saving property at sea. u28 The idea of
salvage is an invention of admiralty. On land, one who goes to the
rescue of his neighbor's property receives no remuneration for his
efforts. The contrary development in maritime law is the result of
a strong underlying policy aimed at aiding men and ships in dis-
tress. 29  When one realizes the expense involved in a ship's deviat-
ing from course and the dangers frequently encountered in rescue
operations, this bounty given by law is better understood.
Historically, life saving was regarded as a moral duty, and no
award was granted life salvors. 30 Since 1912, however, life salvors
"who have taken part in the services rendered on the occasion of the
accident giving rise to salvage" are, by statute, "entitled to a fair
share of the remuneration awarded to the salvors of the vessel, her
cargo, and accessories."' 31 There is, however, no award for saving
lives absent property salvage.
Essentially there are three elements to a valid salvage claim.
First, the ship or property must have been so imperiled that without
the salvor's aid it could not have been rescued. Second, a voluntary
act on the part of the salvors is essential. There must be no pre-ex-
isting duty to render assistance, as there might be, for example, un-
der a contract, or as there is between a vessel and its own crew.
Third, the salvor must successfully save, 'or assist in the saving of, the
property at risk. 32
It is also interesting to note that salvage is the factor which often
compels captains to remain on board their imperiled vessels, for once
a ship is abandoned anyone may salvage her, and, if not under a pre-
existing duty, such salvor will thus be entitled to a bounty. Remain-
ing steadfast, the captain may be able to overcome the peril or nego-
tiate a reasonable salvage contract. 13  He may also be awaiting as-
sistance from his own company, which assistance he knows to be on
the way.
The traditional view, adopted early by the Supreme Court, was
that property, to be the subject of salvage, had to be found on water
and had to be maritime in nature. The phrase, "maritime in nature,"
was limited to the ship, her equipment, and her cargo. However,
128. RoBiNsoN, ADMmIALTY 709 (1939).
129. See The BlackwaU, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1870); Kimes v. United States, 207
F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1953).
130. GILMOIts & BLACK, ADMMALTY § 8-1 (1957).
131. 37 Stat. 242 (1912), 46 U.S.C. 729 (1952).
132. GILMoRE & BLACK, AIMmALlY § 8-2 (1957).
133. Cope v. Valette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887).
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modern American courts have deviated from the foregoing position
and have held that any objects rescued from navigable waters may be
the subject of a salvage claim. 4
As previously stated, the doctrine of salvage was founded upon a
public policy of rewarding the saving of lives and property. There-
fore, it is more than mere compensation for services. The factors
which were weighed as early as 1869 in The Blackwall"5 are still
those used in determining the amount of a salvage award. They in-
clude such considerations as labor expended by salvors, value of the
property employed by the salvors, value of the property saved, and,
in addition, such intangibles as skill and energy displayed, risk in-
curred, and the degree of danger from which the property was res-
cued. Where such nebulous items are considered, judicial discretion
cannot help but play a dominating role." 6
Today, salvage awards are generally shared by the owner of the
salving vessel and its crew. Under an old rule, the crew received the
entire award. The new rule, however, is based upon the recognition
that a salvage operation may place in jeopardy a valuable piece of
property, i.e., the owner's ship, and may result in additional expense
to the owner because of the detour from course. Today, the ten-
dency is toward granting the shipowner the bulk of the award.
GENERAL AVERAGE
A ship caught in a storm may be in danger of sinking. If by
jettisoning a part of the cargo or by destroying a part of the vessel,
the ship and remaining cargo are saved, it would be unfair to make
the owners of the sacrificed property bear the entire loss with no
right of contribution from the owners of the property saved. Conse-
quently, from the earliest of times, admiralty has required that "...
the loss occasioned for the benefit of all must be made good by the
contribution of all. ' "37  This is the basis of the doctrine of general
average.
In 1850, the United States Supreme Court in Barnard v. Ad-
ams138 stated that three things must concur in order to constitute a
case for general average:
134. Colby v. Todd Packing Co., 77 F. Supp. 956 (D. Alaska 1948). In Broere v. $2,133,
72 F. Supp. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), salvage was awarded to a boatman who fished a dead body
from the waters of N. Y. Harbor, the body containing a wallet. The contents of the wallet, as
can be seen from the title of the case, were made the subject of a libel in rem. See dictum in
Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954), to the effect that a sea-
plane when on the sea is subject to salvage.
135. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
136. Except where the property saved is of small value, an "award of anywhere near 50%
would be exceptional. Where large values are involved no recent case awards more than about
20%." GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 465 (1957).
137. This quotation from the Digest of Justinian is set forth in GILMORE & BLAK, AD-
MIRALTY 220 (1957).
138. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 270 (1850).
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1. A common danger; a danger in which ship, cargo and crew all
participate; a danger imminent and apparently "inevitable," except by vol-
untarily incurring the loss of a portion of the whole to save the re-
mainder.
2. There must be a voluntary jettison, jactas, or casting away of
some portion of the joint concern for the purpose of avoiding the immi-
nent peril, periculi imminentis evitandi causa, or, in other words, a
transfer of the peril from the whole to a particular portion of the whole.
3. The attempt to avoid the imminent common peril must be suc-
cessful.
13 9
In addition to losses which arise from physical sacrifices of the
ship or cargo, losses arising out of extraordinary expenses incurred
for the benefit of the ship and cargo are compensable by general
average contribution. 40 These are known as "general average ex-
penditures," and include such expenses as wages and provisions for
the crew while the vessel is in a port of refuge,' 4 ' salvage pay-
ments, 142 and payments for repairs made in a port of refuge to the
extent that the repairs are reasonably necessary to enable the ship to
continue the voyage. 43
As to the theory of general average, it must be noted that while
the property sacrificed is entitled to contribution from the property
saved, it is not entitled to be made whole, but must bear its propor-
tionate share of the loss. 44  Further, all interests benefited by the
voluntary sacrifice of a part of the property must contribute. With
respect to the latter proposition, the interests which may be bene-
fited by a sacrifice are the ship, the cargo, and the freight pending at
the time of the sacrifice ("freight" means what the ship earns for
carrying the cargo).
Unless the contract of carriage provides otherwise, a shipowner
can collect freight only upon delivery of the cargo to its agreed desti-
nation. 45 Consequently, a sacrifice of part of the cargo benefits the
earning capacity of the ship, as well as the remaining cargo and the
ship itself.'4 6
The calculation or "adjustment" of general average claims is
highly complicated and is performed by specialists known as "ad-
139. Id. at 303. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, one who is at fault cannot
recover a general average contribution. See, GILMORE & BLACK, ADmIRALTY 243-46 (1957).
140. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY §§ 5-2, -11 (1957).
141. The Star of Hope v. Annan, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 203 (1870).
142. Magdala S.S. Co. v. H. Baars Co., 101 Fed. 303 (2d Cir. 1900).
143. The Queen, 28 Fed. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
144. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 5-1 (1957).
145. See The Tornado, 108 U.S. 342 (1883).
146. Contracts of carriage frequently provide that the freight is to be paid in advance, and is
not to be recovered by the shipper in any event; or that freight is payable even if the vessel or
goods were lost or the voyage broken up. In such instances, it is the cargo owner who must
contribute when a sacrifice saves the goods upon which such freight is paid or payable. See
2 ARNOULD, MARINE INsuRANCE 906 (13th ed. 1950).
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justers." The example which follows illustrates in the most elemental
manner the calculations involved.
Assume a maritime venture involving a ship worth $500,000; a
cargo, all of which is owned by A, worth $300,000; and pending freight
of the value of $200,000. The total venture is $1,000,000. If it is
assumed that in a situation of peril, goods of A to the extent of $80,000
were jettisoned, and that the freight on these goods would have been
$20,000, had they reached their destination, there is a total sacrifice of
$100,000. In figuring the value of the contributory interests, the ship-
owner's interest is $700,000 (value of ship plus freight), and the cargo
owners' interest is $300,000. Thus, the total of the contributory values
is $1,000,000, and the total amount of loss -is $100,000, or ten percent of
the total venture. The $100,000 loss is adjusted so as to be borne equally
'by all parties in proportion to their interests at risk. Ten percent of
the cargo interest at risk is $30,000. Ten percent of the shipowner's
interest at risk equals $70,000. Since the shipowner, by the jettison,
has suffered only a $20,000 loss of freight - a sum less than his proper
share of the loss - he recovers nothing from the cargo owner. How-
ever, the cargo has sustained a loss of $80,000, which is $50,000 more
than its proper share. Consequently, the shipowner must pay $50,000
to the cargo owner. This payment, when added to his $20,000 loss of
freight, makes the shipowner's total contribution $70,000, or ten percent
of the value of his interest in ship and freight. Similarly, after receipt
of the $50,000 payment, the cargo owner has contributed $30,000, and
properly so, for this sum is his own contribution, i.e., ten percent of his
$300,000 interest. 147
The exact losses included in the general average, their calculation,
and the interests which shall bear them vary from country to country.
Further, the law of general average in great commercial nations, such
as the United States and England, can only be ascertained after the
consideration of a multitude of court decisions.' 4 8
In an attempt to obviate these difficulties, representatives of the
shipping industry from all parts of the world met in Liverpool in
1890, and promulgated a set of general average rules known as the
York-Antwerp Rules. Revisions of these rules were made in 1924,
and again in 1950. While these rules have never been enacted into
law, parties are free to incorporate them into marine insurance poli-
cies, or other maritime contracts, and today, almost without excep-
tion, they are incorporated by reference into bills of lading.
Since the York-Antwerp Rules do not cover every situation which
may arise in general average, it is also commonly stated in maritime
contracts that as to matters not provided for by the rules, the laws
and usages of the place where the adjustment is to be drawn up shall
govern, and that the adjustment shall be drawn up either at a speci-
147. For other examples of adjustments, see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 222-23
(1957); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 788 (1939); ARNOULD, MARINE INSURANCE 911 (13th
ed. 1950).
148. LowNDEs & RUDOLPH, GENERAL AvERAGE AND THE YoRK-ANTWERP RULES 343
(8th ed. 1955).
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fied port or place, or at any place selected by the shipowner or
carrier.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Nations have generally found it in their best interests to promote
strong merchant marines. Within this perspective it was not diffi-
cult for shipowners throughout the world to convince their govern-
ments of the advantages in protecting them from liabilities which re-
sult from marine disasters. In 1851, American shipowners demanded
and obtained the Limitation of Liability Act,'49 which was patterned
primarily after that of the English with whom they had to compete.
Briefly, this act limited the liability of the shipowner to the value of
the ship after the disaster.
In 1935, with respect to claims based on bodily injury and loss of
life, Congress extended the liability of owners of seagoing vessels. 150
As amended, the shipowner in certain instances is obliged to contrib-
ute up to an amount equal to $60.00 per ton of the vessel's gross
tonnage.'' In order to bring this amendment into play, however, the
following circumstances must exist: (1) the total claims must exceed
the owner's normal limit of liability - the value of his vessel, and
(2) after the property claims have been paid pro rata, the amount
applicable to the payment of losses based on bodily injury and loss of
life must be less than an amount equal to $60.00 per ton of the ves-
sel's tonnage. If these requisites are met, the owner must make up
the difference.'
The protection afforded under the limitation statute is available
to the owner only if he lacks "privity and knowledge"' 58 of the fault
or wrongful act causing the injury or death. If the shipowner fails
to exercise proper care in the selection of a competent master and
crew, or fails to provide a seaworthy vessel, "privity and knowledge"
may be present and the limitation will not obtain. "Privity and
149. 9 Star. 635 (1851).
150. Rv. STAT. §§ 4283, 4285 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183, 185 (1952).
151. Gross tonnage does not include space occupied and used by the crew. REv. STAT. §
4283 (1875), 46 U.S.C. 183(c) (1952).
152. Thus, if a 1,000 ton ship were valued at $100,000, and the claims against her were
$300,000 for property damage and $100,000 for bodily injury and loss of life, then $75,000
(the proportion of the property damage claims to the total claims times the gross tonnage of
the vessel) would be available to pay the property damage claimants on a pro rata basis, and
only $25,000 would be available to satisfy the bodily injury and death claimants. Inasmuch
as the latter fund is less than $60,000 ($60 times 1,000 gross tons), the shipowner would be
obliged to contribute $35,000. The bodily injury and death claimants would then share the
$60,000 on a pro rata basis. If, however, the property damage claims were $100,000 and the
bodily injury and death claims were $300,000, then $75,000 would be available to pay the
latter claims. Since this fund is in excess of $60,000, the shipowner would be relieved of
any further obligation of payment.
153. REv. STAT. § 4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1952). The standard in
case of fire is absence of "design or neglect" of the owner. REV. STAT. § 4282 (1875), 46
U.S.C. § 182 (1952).
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knowledge," however, are vague concepts, and their meaning in each
instance" "turns on the facts of particular cases."' 54
Invoking the protection of the Limitation Act raises considerable
confusion because of the conflict between the act and the "saving
clause." In addition to setting up the Limitation Act by way of
answer, the shipowner may invoke the act on his own motion. He
will then have to pay into court an amount equivalent to the value of
the ship plus pending freight, post bond, or turn his vessel over to a
trustee. If the aggregate of claims against him clearly exceeds the
limitation of his liability the district court will assume jurisdiction and
will enjoin further prosecution of claims in other courts, state or
federal.
If, however, there is but a single claim, or if the aggregate of all
claims will not exceed the value of the ship, the district court will give
recognition to the saving clause and will refuse to enjoin the prose-
cution of the claims in state courts. 155
SEAMEN'S RIGHTS
In 1823, Mr. Justice Story wrote that:
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness
from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour. They
are generally poor and friendless and acquire habits of gross indulgence,
carelessness, and improvidence....
.... Every court should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon
the rights of seamen. But courts of maritime law have been in the con-
stant habit of extending towards them a peculiar, protecting favor and
guardianship. They are emphatically the wards of admiralty .... 156
That modern American seamen are poor, friendless, and improv-
idefit is questionable. But the safeguards which have been built
around them indicate that they are still wards of the courts and of
Congress, for no other class of workers is treated more solicitously.
5 T
Federal statutes regulate the form and content of shipping arti-
cles 5 ' (the contract of employment between the master and the sea-
man), and provide for supervision by a Coast Guard official where
the signing on for a voyage to a foreign port takes place in the
United States,'5 9 and by a consular officer where it occurs in a foreign
154. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 411 (1943) (The Seminole).
155. A state court, however, does not have jurisdiction to determine the question of limita-
tion of liability. Such determination is exclusively within the domain of the federal admiralty
court. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 10-19 (1957). For an extensive discussion of
the various sections of this statute, as well as caustic criticism, see GILMORE & BLACK, AD-
MIRALTY 663 (1957).
156. Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 483-85 (No. 6047) (C.C. Me. 1823).
157. See Ray, Wards of the Admiralty, ANNUAL REPORT, GREAT LAKES PROTECTIVE
AssOCIATION 58 (1952).
158. 29 Stat. 689, 691 (1897), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 563-64; 38 Star. 1168 (1915), as
amended, 46 U.S.C. § 713 (1952).
159. REv. STAT. § 4512 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 565 (1952).
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port.6 0  Discharge of seamen is also meticulously regulated' 61  For
example, seamen discharged in the United States from merchant ves-
sels engaged in voyages from an American port to any foreign port
must be given their wages in the presence of a Coast Guard official,
who is required to give the seaman a certificate of discharge. 62 At-
tachment or garnishment of a seaman's wages is prohibited, except
that he may be ordered by a court to pay a part of his wages for the
support of his wife or minor children. If he assigns his wages, the
assignment is not binding.16
3
Food and water schedules are set forth (meat every day) ;164
medicines and antiscorbutics must be provided ;165 clothing and heat
are regulated; 66 size (in both square and cubic feet) and condition
of living quarters are prescribed; 167 and, except in cases of extraordi-
nary emergency, seamen are prohibited from working more than
eight hours in one day. 68
Maintenance and Cure
It is only since the enactment of workmen's compensation acts 6"
that the shore worker has had any form of job insurance. Seamen,
however, with their right to maintenance and cure, have enjoyed such
insurance from medieval times.
Maintenance and cure is an obligation imposed by the general
maritime law upon the shipowner and the vessel - independent of
fault - and arises out of the employment relationship. 70 The lia-
160. 34 Stat. 100 (1906), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 570 (1952).
161. REv. STAT. 55 4549-53 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 55 641-45 (1952); 25 Stat. 80
(1886), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 646 (1952).
162. REv. STAT. 55 4549, 4551, 4612 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 55 641, 643, 713
(1952). This serves as evidence of the seaman's service. If the seaman carries a book
known as a continuous discharge book, his record of service is entered in this book and he is
not given a certificate of service. REV. STAT. 5 4551 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 643
(1952).
163. 38 Stat. 1169 (1915), 46 U.S.C. 5 601 (1952).
164. 38 Stat. 1168 (1915), 46 U.S.C. 5 713 (1952). Any three or more of the crew may
complain as to the quantity or quality of the food and water, or for the failure to keep medi-
cines and antiscorbutics. REv. STAT. 55 4565-70, (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 55 662-67
(1952).
165. REv. STAT. 55 4569-70 (1875), 46 U.S.C. 55 666-67 (1952).
166. REv. STAT. § 4572 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 669 (1952); 23 Stat. 56 (1884),
46 U.S.C. 5 670 (1952).
167. 49 Star. 1380 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 55 660-1 (1952).
168. 52 Stat. 944 (1938), 46 U.S.C. § 673 (1952). Mutiny on the Bounty type discipline
is not permitted. Flogging and the infliction of any corporal or cruel and unusual punishment
is prohibited. If, however, a seaman disobeys any lawful order given at sea, he may be placed
in irons. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2191 (1946); 53 Stat 1147 (1939), 46 U.S.C. § 701 (1952); 38
Stat. 1167 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. 5 712 (1952).
169. New York passed the first act in 1910.
170. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). That the seaman cannot contract away
this right, see Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc , 287 U.S. 367 (1932); Harden v. Gordon,
11 Fed. Cas. 480 (No. 6047) (C.C. Me. 1823).
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bility begins when the seaman signs his articles and lasts until he is
discharged.' Under the doctrine, the seaman who falls ill or is in-
jured without gross or willful misconduct on his part is entitled to
wages to the end of the period for which he was hired, food and
lodging (maintenance), and proper care, including nursing and medi-
cal treatment (cure), until the point of maximum cure is attained. 1'7
The obligation is owed only to seamen. However, for the purposes
of maintenance and cure, the term "seamen" includes all members
of the ship's crew, or company, whatever their duties: the master, the
deck hands, the bartender, and the musicians.' 7 3
The illness or injury, however, does not have to "arise out of and
in the course of"'7 4 the seaman's employment or otherwise be related
causally to his duties aboard the vessel; for with the exception of in-
jury and illness
... caused by the seaman's gross and willful misconduct or existing at
the time the seaman signed on and knowingly concealed by him, the ship-
owner is liable for any injury which occurs or any illness which mani-
fests itself while the seaman is under articles.' 7 5
In Farrell v. United States,' 6 a seaman was injured while re-
turning to his ship from shore leave. He had overstayed his leave
two hours, and, at about eight o'clock, in rain and darkness, started
back to his ship. He became lost in the waterfront area and fell over
a guard chain into a dry-dock which was lighted sufficiently for night
work then in progress. In Wlarren v. United States,7 7 a seaman
went ashore on leave in Naples. He and two other crew members
did some sightseeing. The three of them drank one bottle of wine
and then went to a dance hall. A room adjoining the dance hall
overlooked the ocean. French doors opened onto an unprotected
ledge which extended from the building a few feet. Warren stepped
to within six inches of the ledge and leaned over to take a look. As
he did so, he took hold of an iron rod which appeared to be attached
171. See Calmar Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938); Cortes v. Baltimore In-
sular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); The Progress, 21 F. Supp. 572 (D. Wash. 1937). Since
the obligation is imposed upon both the employer and the vessel, the seaman may proceed in
rem against the ship or in personam against the employer. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
172. See 2 NORRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 535-605 (1952). There is no time limit on
the duration of the shipowner's liability so long as there is a chance for improvement in the
seaman's condition. Once maximum cure is reached, maintenance and cure ends. However,
if by reason of subsequent medical advances the seaman's condition can be improved, the right
to maintenance and cure will be revived. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 265 (1957).
173. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 255 (1957); 2 NoRRis, THE LAW OF SEAMEN
§ 549 (1952). Harbor workers, who for some other purposes are regarded as "seamen," are
not entitled to maintenance and cure. GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. su pra at 255.
174. Most workmen's compensation acts require that to be compensable, the injury must
arise out of and in the course of employment. See PROSSER, TORTS 528 (1st ed. 1941).
175. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 254 (1957).
176. 336U.S. 511 (1949).
177. 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
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to the building. The rod came off, Warren lost his balance and fell,
breaking a leg. Both Farrell and Warren were held entitled to main-
tenance and cure.
That the seaman by his own fault may forfeit his right to main-
tenance and cure has never been questioned. However, to work a
forfeiture, his conduct must have an element of willfulness about it.
Illness or injury resulting from venereal disease or intoxication are
the traditional examples of willful misconduct, "though on occasion
the latter has been qualified in recognition of a classic predisposition
of sailors ashore."1 8  Concepts such as contributory negligence, 17
the fellow servant doctrine, and assumption of risk, however, have
no relevance insofar as maintenance and cure is concerned.80
The shipowner may discharge his liability to provide maintenance
and cure by tendering the seaman a certificate of admission into a
United States Marine Hospital and by providing, or offering to pro-
vide, him with transportation thereto. If the seaman refuses to enter
the Marine Hospital and enters another hospital, or consults private
physicians, he cannot, by the weight of authority, recover such ex-
pense from the shipowner. 8"
If the shipowner fails to provide adequate maintenance and cure,
the seaman may sue in personam or in rem in admiralty,112 or in a
land court under the "saving to suitors" clause. 8 3 He may recover
whatever reasonable expenses he has actually sustained, plus "such
amounts as may be needful in the immediate future for the main-
tenance and cure of a kind and for a period which can be definitely
ascertained.' ' 8 4
178. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 731 (1943); GILMORE & BLAcK, ADmR-
ALTY 260 (1957).
179. Negligence, whether ordinary or gross, does not defeat the seaman's claim. The standard
of conduct prescribed as a forfeiture is not one of due care, but of willful misbehavior. In the
eyes of the law, willful misbehavior need not be conduct intended to produce the identical
result which caused the injury, but may be conduct which is intentionally heedless and reckless
of ordinary consequences. Driving a car at a speed of 90 miles an hour down Times Square
in New York City on New Year's eve, without the intention of hitting anyone, is willful mis-
conduct. Some of the admiralty cases refer to such conduct as gross negligence, but it is appar-
ent that they really mean willful misbehavior. 2 NoRRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN 229 (1952).
180. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 731 (1943). In both the Farrell and
Warren cases the seamen were found to have been negligent. Indeed, anyone who falls into
a lighted dry dock, as the plaintiff did in the Farrell case, would appear to be grossly negligent.
181. Benton v. United Towing Co., 120 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Cal. 1954); The Bouker No.
2, 241 Fed. 831 (2d Cir. 1917). Also see GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 266 (1957).
"When the man is put on out-patient status the duty to maintain continues ordinarily until
the man is certified by the U. S. Public Health Service as fit for duty." ROBINSON, ADMIR-
ALTY 295, n. 71 (1939).
182. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). If the suit is against the United States, it can only
be brought in personam. 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1952).
183. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
184. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). GILMORE & BLAK, ADMIRALTY
266 (1957). In 1939, the Shipowner's Liability Convention, which contains a detailed treat-
ment of the liability for maintenance and care, became effective in the United States by presi.
dential proclamation. However, Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951), scuttled the
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In addition, the failure of the master or the shipowner to provide
proper maintenance and cure may entitle the seaman to damages for
personal injury.8 5 Thus, if the failure causes or aggravates an ill-
ness, the seaman has a right of action for the injury sustained by him.
The recovery in such instances includes not only increased expenses,
but also compensation for pain and suffering and for loss of future
earnings. 86
Unseaworthiness
Historically, maintenance and cure marked the limit of the ship
and shipowner's liability to an injured seaman. By the early 1900's,
however, it was recognized under the general maritime law that the
ship and her owner were liable for injuries sustained by seamen in
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the vessel, or of a failure to
supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the
ship.87 In addition to the ship's structure and appliances, the fitness
of the crew has been made a condition of the seaworthiness of the
vessel. 88 A duty is imposed upon the shipowner to man the vessel
with seamen "equal in disposition and seamanship to the ordinary
men in the calling.' 11 9  Therefore, when one crew member assaults
another, if the assault was within the usual and customary standards
of the calling - a normal sailor's brawl - the shipowner is not
liable. On the other hand, if ". . . it is a case of a seaman with a
wicked disposition, a propensity to evil conduct, a savage and vicious
convention and it has not been mentioned since. For a detailed explanation, see GILMORE &
BLACK, ADMnRALTY § 6-19 (1957).
185. Recovery may be had either in an action for maintenance and cure or in an action for
negligence under the Seaman's Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1952). Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932) (death resulting from
neglect of illness held within Jones Act). That recovery may be had against the master if he
fails to fulfill his obligations to the seaman, see Tomlinson v. Hewitt, 24 Fed. Cas. 29 (No.
14087) (D. Cal. 1872). Also see 2 NORRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN §§ 579-85 (1952).
186. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); Sims v. United States of Amer-
ica War Shipping Admin., 186 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951)
(Fact shipowner in good faith refuses maintenance and cure to seaman because of belief that
seaman's claim is fraudulent does not relieve shipowner).
187. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (dictum); also see Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) (gasoline put in can marked coal oil which was customarily
used to pour over wood in cook stove to start fire. In so using it, Sandanger's clothes caught
fire; his injuries were aggravated during time spent searching for non-existent life preserver
before he jumped into water and extinguished flames); Krey v. United States, 123 F.2d 1008(2d Cit. 1941) (no handles on shower stall sides. Seaman slipped and fell); Henry Gillen's
Sons Lighterage, Inc. v. Fernald, 294 Fed. 520 (2d Cit. 1923) (seaman's foot caught in a hole
in deck sheathing; struck by a load of copper before he could get free).
188. See Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (shipowner liable when
seaman assaulted with a bottle by a crew member found to be a person of violent character, dis-
posed to fighting, etc.); Jones v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Inc., 204 F.2d 815 (2d Cit. 1953) (ship-
owner liable to seaman struck with meat cleaver by cook); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp.,
194 F.2d 515 (2d Cit. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952) (assault with fists; no evi-
dence assailant had a reputation for brutality, fighting, etc.; shipowner not liable).
189. Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cit. 1952), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 966 (1952).
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nature ... ,..10 then the ship is unseaworthy, whether or not the
owner or officers knew, or ought to have known of the vicious char-
acter of the assailant.191
Thus, it is obvious that the doctrine of unseaworthiness has de-
veloped into a species of absolute liability - a liability without
fault.'92 No amount of care or diligence on the part of the shipowner
relieves him of his obligation to provide a seaworthy ship, appliances,
and crew. Lack of notice or knowledge of such defects on the part
of the owner, the master, or ship's officers is not a defense. Also,
the common-law rules under which either assumption of risk or con-
tributory negligence wholly bar an injured person from recovering
have never been recognized in unseaworthiness actions. Exercising
its traditional discretion, admiralty developed its own more flexible
rule, which allows the damages to be mitigated, or diminished, in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the injured
seaman.
93
Prior to the case of Mahnich v. Southern 8.8. Co.,'9 decided in
1944, many actions for unseaworthiness failed because the proximate
cause of the injury was found to have been negligence on the part of
the master or some other crew member, rather than a defect in the
equipment or appliance furnished the injured seaman. Since Mahnich,
however, negligence of the ship's personnel does not bar the action of
unseaworthiness, provided the plaintiff can "find some handhold of
unseaworthiness to cling to."'9 5 Mahnich was injured by a fall from
a staging, which gave way when a piece of defective rope supporting
it parted. The rope was supplied by the mate when there was ample
sound rope available for use in rigging the staging. "If the owner is
liable for furnishing an unseaworthy appliance even when he is not
negligent," wrote Mr. Chief Justice Stone for the majority of the
court, "a fortiori his obligation is unaffected by the fact that the
negligence of the officers of the vessel contributed to its unseaworthi-
ness.'
196
190. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 340 (1955). "A vessel bursting at the
seams might well be a safer place than one with a homicidal maniac as a member." Ibid.
191. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Keen v. Overseas Tankship
Corp., 194 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952).
192. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
328 U.S. 85 (1946). Also see statement to this effect in Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321
U.S. 96 (1944). Just how far this "absolute liability" doctrine extends is not clear. For
example, several lower courts have questioned its applicability to conditions arising after the
vessel has begun her voyage. See Dixon v. United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cit. 1955); Casbon
v. Stockard Steamship Corp., 173 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. La. 1959). For a detailed discussion
of the problem, see GILMORE & BLAcK, ADMA.LTY §§ 6-42 to -44 (1957).
193. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Seeandbee, 102 F.2d 577
(6th Cit. 1939). Also see statement to this effect in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith,
305 U.S. 424 (1939); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
194. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
195. GiLMORE & BLAcK, ADmmALTY 320 (1957).
196. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 100 (1944).
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Thus, as a result of the evolution of unseaworthiness, the only
case which is today clearly outside its scope ". . . is the almost
theoretical construct of an injury whose only cause is an order improv-
idently given by a concededly competent officer on a ship admitted
to be in all respects seaworthy.'
9 7
Negligence and the Jones Act
Earlier, it was indicated that by 1920 seamen were entitled to
both maintenance and cure and to indemnity for injury resulting from
unseaworthiness. Although maintenance and cure provided care for
the seaman during the period of his injury or illness, it did not com-
pensate him for the wrong done. Further, "unseaworthiness" at this
time was essentially confined to defects in the structure of the vessel
and its equipment. It did not include negligence on the part of the
seaman's officers or fellow crew members.Y" To remedy this situa-
tion, Congress, in 1920, passed the Jones Act. 9
The Jones Act incorporates by reference the Federal Employers'
Liability Act of 1908,200 which applies in cases of personal injury to
railway workers. In substance, these acts have been interpreted as
giving a seaman injured during the course of his employment a right
of action against the shipowner if: (a) he is injured by the negli-
gence of the shipowner, master, or fellow crew members,20 ' or (b) his
197. GILMORB & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 320 (1957). See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406, 418 (1953), for the remark by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion that
1.1. it will be rare that the circumstances of an injury will constitute negligence but not un-
seaworthiness."
198. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
199. In 1915, Congress had passed an act abolishing the fellow-servant rule as to seamen.
Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153 § 20, 38 Stat. 1164. In Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 243
Fed. 536 (2d Cit. 1917), aff'd., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), in denying recovery to an injured sea-
man, it was held that under the general maritime law- independent of the fellow-servant
rule - there was no recovery for negligence of master or crew, and that § 20 of the 1915 Act
was, therefore, irrelevant. Congress then passed the Jones Act, amending § 20 of the Act of
1915. The Jones Act provides: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right
of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and
in case of death of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal representa-
tive of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law... " 41 Star. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
200. 35 Star. 65-66 (1908), 36 Star. 291 (1910), 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. 5
51-60 (1952). Section 51 of the FELA provides that an employee of an interstate railway
carrier may recover damages from the carrier for ". . . injury or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by
reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery ... or other equipment."
201. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); Corella v. McCormick Shipping
Corp., 101 So. 2d 903 (Fla. App. 1958). For the liberal meaning given "negligence," see
Alpha Steamship Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930), wherein it was held that an assault on
a seaman by superior officer committed in course of the discharge of his duties and in further-
ance of work of the employer's business is negligence within meaning of the Jones Act. Also
see Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930).
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injury is the result of the violation of a statutory duty, even though
the injury is not of the type the statute sought to guard against.202
Except for the almost theoretical case of unseaworthiness for
which the shipowner is in no way chargeable with fault, "negligence"
under the Jones Act logically would appear to cover all forms of un-
seaworthiness. 2  In any event, it has been held to include conduct
such as the negligent failure of the shipowner to supply and maintain
a seaworthy ship and appliances,"' and the continued employment by
the ship's officers of a man who was or should have been known by
them to have a vicious character. 205
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and therefore un-
der the Jones Act, the fact that an injured employee has been guilty
of contributory negligence does ".... not bar a recovery, but the dam-
ages ... [are] diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to such employee . "..."206 And by judicial de-
cision, assumption of risk as a defense to a Jones Act suit has also
been abolished. In Socony-Tacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, °7 Mr. Justice
Stone, for the majority, said: "Any rule of assumption of risk in ad-
miralty, whatever its scope, must be applied in conjunction with the
established admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence and in har-
mony with it."208  It would be "inconsistent and an impractical re-
finement" to apply assumption of risk "in a system of law which
maintains the comparative negligence rule to the fullest extent." 209
The act applies only to injuries suffered by "seamen." As the
term is interpreted at present, it means "a man who goes to sea, a
member of a ship's company (including the master), a person em-
ployed upon a floating structure which is a vessel."210  Further, it
202. Kernam v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958), reversing sub -nom. In re
American Dredging Co., 235 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1956), affirming 141 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa.
1956). Seaman lost his life when open-flame kerosene lamp, which was on deck of tug and
which was not more than three feet above water, when navigation rule required it to be eight
feet above water, ignited vapors above accumulation of petroleum products on river surface.
Held: recovery granted even though rule violated was not passed for protection of seamen and
even though tug owner was not otherwise at fault.
203. GILMORE & BLAcK, A.DMIALTY 313 (1957).
204. Koehler v. United States, 187 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1951); Larsen v. United States, 72
F. Supp. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
205. Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1945); Koehler v. Presque-Isle Trans-
port Co., 141 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944).
206. 35 Stat 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1952).
207. 305 U.S. 424 (1939). Also see The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936); Beadle
v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936). For an excellent discussion of the matter, see GILMORE &
BLAcK, ADrnMIALTY § 6-26 (1957).
208. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939).
209. Id. at 432.
210. Harbor workers, such as longshoremen, are not seamen under the Jones Act. GILMORE &
BLACK, ADMIRALTY 282 (1957). A foreign seaman on a foreign flagship cannot sue under the
Jones Act in an American court, even though he had signed articles in the United States, or
was injured in American territorial waters. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating
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appears that the act could be used by the seaman only in a suit against
his employer.21' To recover against one not his employer, the sea-
man must use a remedy other than the Jones Act.
The Jones Act provides that the injured seaman "... may, at his
election, maintain an action for damages at law, with a trial by
jury .... ,212 This has been construed as giving the seaman an option
to sue either on the common-law side213 or the admiralty side (where
there is no jury)2 14 of a federal district court, or in a state court.215
If, however, suit is brought in a common-law court, the federal ad-
miralty interpretations of the act govern, for in any maritime cause
of action, the substantive law which must be applied is the maritime
law.
21 6
In Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio,217 the Supreme Court held that
the Jones Act does not create a maritime lien in favor of an injured
seaman. Since a maritime lien is essential to an action in rem, pro-
ceedings in rem are not maintainable in Jones Act suits. 218  There-
fore, even if suit is on the admiralty side of the federal district court,
only an action in personam can be brought.
It seems safe to conclude that today an injured seaman may, in
the same suit, join counts for maintenance and cure, unseaworthiness,
and negligence under the Jones Act.219  He may go to trial on all
Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); 2 NoRis, THE
LAW OF SEAMEN § 670-81 (1952).
211. Southern Shell Fish Co. v. Plaisance, 196 F.2d 312 (5th Cit. 1952). See also Cosmo-
politan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949) (dictum). Seamen employed by
the United States who are covered by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act cannot sue
under the Jones Act. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-21 (1957). For rights of
such seamen when not covered by the Compensation Act, see 2 NORRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN,
§ 700 (1952).
212. 41 Star. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
213. If the minimum amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, the district court has jurisdic-
tion regardless of whether there is diversity of citizenship, since the action involves the applica-
tion of a law [the Jones Act) of the United States, and is, therefore, within 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V, 1958). See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). See note 98 supra.
214. Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) (dictum); Brown v. C. D. Mallory
Co., 122 F.2d 98 (3d Cit. 1941). Also see 2 NoRRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN 5 668 (1952).
215. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Engel v. Davenport, 271
U.S. 33 (1926). Except where a shipowner is able to bring himself within the Limitation of
Liability Act, he cannot effect the removal of a suit based wholly on the Jones Act from a state
to a federal court. See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cit. 1952). Also
see GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY § 6-28 (1957).
216. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
217. 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
218. The Plama2s case, supra note 217, involved a suit in rem in admiralty. In Panama RL1L
Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926), an in personam action begun in a state court, it was
stated by way of dictum that the saving clause does not include suits in rem in common-law
courts.
219. It has long been settled that the seaman could join a count for maintenance and cure
with either a Jones Act count for negligence or an unseaworthiness count. See Calmar Steam-
ship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938); Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
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three and, under separate instructions for each count, may go to the
jury on all three. If a jury verdict for the plaintiff is supportable
on the maintenance and cure count, and on either the unseaworthi-
ness or the Jones Act count, the judgment for the plaintiff will not
be overturned.220
Recovery for Seaman's Death
In the United States, there is, independent of statute, no right of
action under the maritime law for wrongful death, and an action for
personal injuries does not survive the death of the injured person.22'
Thus, if a seaman is instantly killed, or if he is injured and subse-
quently dies (as a result of such injuries or from another cause) be-
fore he receives judgment, there can be no recovery, either for the
death or for personal loss and pain and suffering resulting from his
injuries prior to death.
Before the passage of the Jones Act 222 in 1920, and the Death on
the High Seas Act 23 in the same year, the courts - including federal
courts of admiralty - alleviated this situation by resorting to the
various state death acts to give a remedy for wrongful death.224
The Jones Act creates a right of action for the wrongful death
of a seaman based upon the statutory action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act.225 The Jones Act-FELA combination also
provides for the survival of any right of action given by FELA.2
In McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), the Court said in a footnote
dictum: "Recent authorities have effectively disposed of suggestions in earlier cases that an in-
jured seaman can be required to exercise an election between his remedies for negligence under
the Jones Act and for unseaworthiness." Lower court authority to the effect that no election
is required has become overwhelming. See Nunes v. Farre Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 619 (1st Cir.
1955) (counts for maintenance and cure, Jones Act, and unseaworthiness joined).
220. See GiLmORE & BLAcK, ADmmALTY 289 (1957).
221. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932); Lindgren v. United States,
281 U.S. 38 (1930); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); Amoth v. United States, 3
F.2d 848 (D. Ore. 1925).
222. 41 Star. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
223. 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1952).
224. Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Witbhi The Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 YALE
L J. 395, 396 (1926). Also see The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907). But when a plaintiff
sued under a state death act, whether at common law or in admiralty, he was subject to any
state-recognized defenses, such as the applicable state statute of limitations or contributory
negligence. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); O'Brien v. Luckenbach
Steamship Co., 293 Fed. 170 (2d Cir. 1923).
225. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952). The personal representative
is given the right under § 51 to sue "for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then
next of kin dependent upon such employee...."
226. 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1952). If the seaman is instantly killed, there
can be no recovery under this section. If he is injured and subsequently dies from such in-
juries, there can be a claim under this section for loss and suffering before his death, and a
claim under § 51 of FELA for the death. For a discussion of the differences between these
sections, see Holiday v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 212
F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1954).
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This enables the personal representative to sue for pain and suffering
and for any pecuniary loss sustained by the seaman before he died.22
In Lindgren v. United States,228 the Supreme Court held that the
Jones Act remedy for wrongful death was exclusive and precluded
any remedy based upon state death acts, even though the injuries re-
sulting in death occur within the territorial waters of the state. As
a result, there is no recovery for death if the claim is based upon un-
seaworthiness, because there is no recovery for death under the gen-
eral maritime law; and unseaworthiness, without proof of negligence
or the violation of a statutory duty, does not bring the claim within
the Jones Act.22 On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in a recent
footnote dictum, said that claims based upon unseaworthiness for
loss and suffering of a seaman prior to his death "presumably" would
survive, ". . . at least if a pertinent state statute is effective to bring
about a survival of the seaman's rights. ' 210
Where death is "caused by wrongful act, neglect or default occur-
ring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies
of the United States . . . ," the personal representative of the deceased
may recover under the Death on the High Seas Act.231 State death
statutes are superseded whenever the fatal injuries occur on the high
seas beyond the distance set forth in the act.23 2
The act permits recovery only for death, and contains no provi-
sion for the survival of the decedent's cause of action. Therefore,
the personal representative, who may bring suit for the relatives,233
cannot recover damages for the loss and suffering of the decedent
between the time of injury and death.234
227. He sues for the benefit of the same class of relatives set forth in § 51. See note 225,
supra.
228. 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
229. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930). For an excellent discussion of the
problem, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
230. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 (1958). The court in the same
footnote also stated that "claims for maintenance and cure survive the death of the seaman.
Sperbeck v. A. L. Burban & Co., 2 Cir., 190 Fed.2d 449." This, too, was dictum. Death
resulting from neglect of an illness (failure to provide proper maintenance and cure) is
within the Jones Act. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
231. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952). The act is not restricted to seamen,
but includes anyone, unless the decedent is covered by a federal statute which restricts suit to
such statute. See 2 NORRis, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 642 (1952). Also see Lacey v. L. W.
Wiggins Airways, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951) (act applied to airplane accident on
high seas).
232. Echavarria v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nay. Co., 10 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1935).
The act does not supersede state death acts where the death injuries occurred on shore or within
a marine league from shore. Nor does it apply to the Great Lakes, to water within the ter-
ritorial limits of any State, or to any navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone. 41 Star. 538
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1952).
233. The personal representative may sue "for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife,
husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." 41 Star. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952).
234. Decker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 560 (D. Mass. 1950); 2 NOR-
Ris, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 640 (1952).
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Although never passed upon by the Supreme Court, the lower
courts have permitted the personal representative to sue the deceased
seaman's employer, the shipowner, under either the Jones Act or the
Death on the High Seas Act, and, under proper circumstances, to re-
cover under both.285
Unlike the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act does not
restrict the personal representative to suit against the seaman's em-
ployer. Thus, in a collision between an American vessel and a for-
eign vessel on the high seas, the personal representative of a seaman
on the American vessel, killed as a result of the fault of the foreign
vessel, has been allowed to recover under the act against the foreign
vessel or its owner.23 6
Recovery under the act is based upon "wrongful act, neglect or
default. ' 237  Consequently, a claim founded on unseaworthiness will
fail unless there is also proof of negligence. 8
CONCLUSION
With the exception of specialists in admiralty, maritime law has
been a subject of which most attorneys have not had even a working
knowledge. It should now be evident that the principles of admiralty
law differ considerably from those areas of the law with which most
lawyers are conversant. Although the purpose of this article has
been to give only a glimpse of the general field, it is hoped that the
reader has been made aware of some of the problems and possibili-
ties of admiralty law and has been prompted to become more familiar
with it - for it is certain that admiralty law will become increasingly
important in the days ahead.
235. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 304 (1957): "The availability of the alternative rem-
edy under the High Seas Act can become of importance because, although like FELA the
High Seas Act limits the recovery to a list of named beneficiaries, the lists in the two statutes
are not the same." See The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947) (recovery for
father under Jones Act; recovery for decedents sister under High Seas Act).
236. The Buenos Aires, 5 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1924) (American and Spanish ship collided).
237. 41 Star. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952). Contributory negligence of the de-
ceased does not bar a recovery, but the court shall consider the degree of negligence attributable
to the decedent and reduce the recovery accordingly. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 766
(1952).
238. See Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.B.2d 533 (1946). Also see
GILMORE & BLACK, ADMRALTY 315 (1957).
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